In almost common value auctions one bidder (the advantaged bidder) has a valuation advantage over all other (regular ) bidders. It is well known that in second-price auctions with two bidders, even a slight private value advantage can have an explosive effect on auction outcomes as the advantaged bidder wins all the time and auction revenue is substantially lower than in a pure secondprice common-value auction. We explore the robustness of these results to the addition of more regular bidders in second-price auctions, and the extent to which these results generalize to ascending-price English auctions in an effort to provide insight into when and why one ought to be concerned about such slight asymmetries.
paper.
First, we explore whether the explosive impact on auction outcomes resulting from a small private-value advantage in second-price auctions extends to auctions with more than one regular bidder. Using the "wallet game" as the benchmark model (Avery and Kagel, 1997 ; Klemperer, 1998) we find that the explosive effect reported in the two bidder case does not generalize to the addition of more regular bidders. In fact, increasing the number of regular bidders generates a continuous dampening of the explosive effects found in the two bidder case. However, somewhat surprisingly, the private value advantage remains, and is substantial, even as the number of regular bidders grows without bound.
In addition, we argue that, other things equal, the seller actually benefits from the additional aggressiveness of an advantaged bidder. What hurts the seller, and often dominates this outcome, is that regular bidders tend to bid less aggressively in most circumstances, which suppresses revenue. Thus, in cases where the regular bidders response to the aggressiveness of the advantaged bidder is small, or nonexistent, revenues may be higher than in the pure common value auction case.
A second example deals with English auctions which always have just two bidders in the last stage. As such, English auctions would seem to be most vulnerable to the explosive effects of small asymmetries. This example shows that even when the private value advantage is such that there exist explosive effects with two bidders, this explosive effect evaporates with the addition of a second regular bidder. That is, in this example, the addition of a second regular bidder is sufficient to eliminate the explosive effect found in the two bidder case, even though the auction inevitably reduces to two bidders in the last stage of the game.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model and then goes on to provide the examples yielding the results outline above.
Section 3 summarizes our analytical results and discusses them in relationship to the limited experimental data on auctions in which one bidder has a private value advantage. Throughout we use very simple models to shed light on these issues and to answer these important questions.
The Model
Preliminary: Let there be n + 1 bidders, n regular bidders denoted by i, i = 1, 2, ..., n, and one advantaged bidder denoted by n + 1. Each of the n + 1 bidders privately observes a signal X i ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, ..., n, n + 1, i.i.d. from a distribution function F (t), on [0, 1], with F 0 (t) = f (t) > 0, on (0, 1).
Denote the valuation of each bidder by V i and the vector of all n + 1 signals by x = (X 1 , ..., X n , X n+1 ). A pure common-value auction in such an environment usually assumes that V i = V (x) for all i. In an almost common-value auction
for only the regular bidders, i = 1, ..., n, while the advantaged bidder, the (n + 1) th bidder, has an (ex-post) valuation V n+1 (x) ≥ V (x), ∀x, with a strict inequality for some x. The idea of a small private value advantage is captured by allowing the possibility that
For example, in the "wallet game" there is one regular bidder (n = 1) and one advantaged bidder with V 1 (x) = X 1 + X 2 and V 2 (x) = V 1 (x) + ²X 2 . (Avery and
Kagel, 1997; Klemperer, 1997 Klemperer, , 1998 . In a second-price, sealed-bid commonvalue auction with ² = 0, the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy is, b(X i ) = 2X i . With ² = 0, the bidder with the highest signal, X H , wins the auction and pays the equilibrium bid of the rival, the holder of the lower signal, which is 2X L .
There is no ex post regret for both the winner and the loser since the winner
and the loser, should she have won,
ex-ante probability of winning is 1/2 and seller's revenue is
However, once ² > 0, no matter how small ² is, the results change drastically:
(1) The advantaged bidder wins all the time and (2) Since the equilibrium strategy of the regular bidder is now b 1 (X 1 ) = X 1 , seller's revenue becomes
, which is substantially lower than revenue in the symmetric case. 4 , 5 The first example shows that the explosive effects of the second-price wallet game do not generalize to auctions more than two bidders. Example 1. Consider the wallet auction with n ≥ 2 regular bidders 4 Avery and Kagel (1997) report a class of asymmetric equilibria in the private value advantage case, and like here, analyze the most aggresive equilibrium in the class. 5 Note that under the standard assumption of increasing hazard rates, ∂[
where t is the unique solution to [1 − 2F (t)] = 0. The reduction in expected revenue can be quite large. With a uniform distribution it goes down with any ² > 0, by 25%, from where, without loss of generality, we use averages, rather than sum of valuations.
The common value for each of the n regular bidders is the average of all the n + 1, i.i.d. signals and the value for the advantaged bidder is larger by having a slightly "extra" value from her private signal. Formally:
.., n is a Nash equilibrium for the second-price auction with n ≥ 2, where,
Proof. See appendix.
Note that with ² = 0 we have
which is the symmetric equilibrium for the pure common value case. With an advantaged bidder, ² > 0,
Here with a tiny ² > 0 and n > 1, the advantaged bidder is only slightly more aggressive than a regular bidder even with just two regular bidders. 7 Next we note that even with just two regular bidders it is obvious that for any small δ > 0, ∃ small enough ε(δ) > 0, such that the ex-ante probability of winning the auction does not exceed 1 3 + δ for the advantaged bidder and is not less than
for the regular bidders. Thus, the advantaged bidder wins only slightly more often than 6 There is a whole class of Nash equilibria but ours is the "closest" to the symmetric one. There are asymmetric, bully-sucker, equilibria even in the pure CV case where one bidder is very aggressive and others are bidding very law. In such equilibria the bully may win all the time and revenue may be very low even in the symmetric structure. 7 With only two bidders, n = 1, the expression for the advantaged bidder, b 2 (X 2 ) is "divided by zero," suggesting that in this case the advantaged bidder ought to bid "very aggressively." Bikhchandani's (1987) paper explicitly poses the question of the stability of the symmetric equilibirum with ε > 0 and n > 1, with no solution to this question identified prior to this. 
where y H and y L , represent the highest and lowest signals of the regular bidders. In contrast, a regular bidder who holds y 0 , must consider an additional event in calculating her willingness to pay, namely: B =: 
Nevertheless, in equilibrium, as in our proposition, the overall expected utility of a regular bidder weighted by the probabilities of events A and B can be (is) the same as the expected utility of the advantaged bidder conditional on event
A. An additional complication that must be kept in mind (accounted for in our derivation) is to calculate the correct posterior probabilities of a tie coming from the advantaged bidder or from another regular bidder.
A more intuitive, though less revealing, answer as to why the explosive effect disappears is that with more than one regular bidder, the regular bidder needs to shave her bid by less to guard against the winner's curse coming from the aggressiveness of the advantaged bidder, since the tieing bid may be with another regular bidder who is not as aggressive as the advantaged bidder. The result is less bad news as a result of winning for a regular bidder, hence less need to shave their bids in response to the winner's curse.
The impact of additional competition on bidding, although continuing to mitigate the asymmetry, does not eliminate it altogether. With one more regular bidder,
represents the new bidding ratio and it is simple to show that
Thus, as competition grows this ratio is getting smaller, starting with
with only two regular bidders. However, the equilibrium does not converge to that of the symmetric second-price auction equilibrium as n grows: As lim n→∞ b n+1 (X) = and
, where ε ∈ (0, 1). Consider first a SPA with only two bidders. The SNE bidding function for the pure CV case (ε = 0), is given by B 1 (X) = B 2 (X) = given that their signal is X and that no one has dropped yet. We assume in this example that when the first bidder drops the two remaining bidders can tell whether a regular bidder or an advantaged bidder has dropped. 9 Thus, let Proposition 2 The profile of strategies:
Nash Equilibrium of this English Auction.
Proof. We show first that there are strictly positive expected profits for all bidders in the proposed equilibrium. If all bidders follow the proposed strategies then the holder of Y 3 , regardless of her type, would be the first to drop out so that
The advantaged bidder drops first. In this case the regular bidder holding Y 2 , drops next and sets a price of d
. The winner is the regular bidder holding the highest signal, Y 1 and her 9 We also have an example of an English auction with three bidders where only the drop-out price but not the identity of the bidder is revealed. This example makes the same point as the one here. In it, the advantaged bidder adopts in equilibrium the same strategy as a regular bidder regardless of her signal value and there is no explosiveness. However, the example provided here is more realistic (and challenging) as one could argue that often bidders know the identity of those who drop out.
payoffs are: . The winner is the advantaged bidder and her payoffs are [
Next, we show that an advantaged bidder has no incentive to deviate from the proposed equilibrium when all others follow it. . By winning the advantaged bidder earns: the advantaged bidder drops first it implies that her signal must be Y 2 . In this case the price is set by the other regular who holds
. Thus by deviating and winning such a regular bidder earns:
< 0. Thus, in case 2, the regular bidder who holds the lowest signal does not wish to deviate and drops first at
Given this, the other regular bidder who holds one of the two highest signals has no reason to deviate, as winning against the advantaged bidder (who bids 1 in this case) assures losses.
It is worth noting that in cases where a regular bidder drops first, and the advantaged bidder bids aggressively enough to assure winning, the remaining regular bidder is not using dominated bids. That is, once a regular bidder drops at d 1 = Y 3 , the remaining regular bidder who holds Z ≥ d 1 infers that the value of the item is at least
, as the signal of the advantaged bidder must be at least d 1 ,and in equilibrium does not use dominated lower bids.
In equilibrium the bidder with the lowest signal drops out first regardless of her identity. If the advantaged bidder drops first then the two remaining regular bidders proceed as if in a pure common-value auction. However, if, as equilibrium dictates, a regular bidder drops first then the advantaged bidder bids aggressively enough to assure winning. Thus, although in a two bidders auction the advantaged bidder wins all the time, here in equilibrium her ex-ante probability of winning is only 2/3. And, of course, there is positive incentive for regular bidders to enter the auction in the first place.
In any realizations where the advantaged bidder holds the lowest signal the seller's revenue is the same as in the pure common-value auction. In realizations where the advantaged bidders has one of the two highest signals and wins the differences between the seller's revenue in the almost common-value auction and the pure common-value auction is
It worth nothing that this last expression may be positive for certain distribution functions. 10 The reason that a third bidder "stabilizes" the English auction is quite different here than in our first example. The English auction is a dynamic auction where bidders update their beliefs and thus their assessment of the value of the item as the auction progresses. An advantaged bidder who wishes to exploit her advantage while holding the lowest signal must refrain from exiting the auction.
However, defection by such inaction necessarily raises the price to a level that such defection is unprofitable. This is the case in spite of the fact that the remaining regular bidder would adopt a less aggressive strategy after observing that a regular bidder had dropped out first. there is an explosive effect on revenue and winning in the two bidder case, but this explosive effect does not carry over to an English auction with more than one regular bidder. This is important since one can legitimately argue that an English auction reduces to a two bidder auction in the end. While far from proving that one need not worry about such explosive effects in English auctions, it does demonstrate that these explosive effects are not inevitable in English auctions with more than one regular bidder even when they are present in the two bidder case.
The available empirical evidence also leaves ample scope for experimental investigation of almost common value auctions. As noted, Avery and Kagel (1997) found a proportionate rather than explosive response to one bidder having a private value advantage in the wallet game, contrary to the theory's prediction.
This might be explained by the fact that both inexperienced and once experienced bidders suffered from a winner's curse (failed to account for the winner's curse) in the symmetric second-price common value auctions used as a control condition. Recall that within the theory the explosive effect of the private value advantage results from the regular bidder fully accounting for the heightened adverse selection effect associated with beating the advantaged bidder. However, to the extent that bidders fail to fully account for this adverse selection effect (they suffer from a winner's curse) this explosive effect on revenue will not be realized. 11 The Avery-Kagel experiment begs the question of whether more experienced bidders who have learned to largely avoid the winner's curse would respond appropriately to the presence of an advantaged bidder. While one might presume this to be the case, to the extent that learning tends to be situation specific, rather than involving some deeper understanding of the economic forces at work in the environment (for which there is some evidence, at least with repsect to the winner's curse; see Kagel and Levin, 1986) , the fact that bidders have learned to avoid the winner's curse in the symmetric case might not prepare them for the heightened adverse selection effect associated with the private value advantage case. Further, and with an eye to situations outside the lab, one must consider the extent to which bidders can be taught to understand these adverse selection effects, as advantaged bidders have an obvious incentive to have their disadvantaged rivals understand their disadvantageous position in order to induce them to bid more passively.
12 11 There are several other examples where bidders suffering from a winner's curse fail to obey the comparative static predictions of the theory: the effects of public information on seller revenue, the revenue raising possibilities inherent in ascending price English auctions compared to sealed-bid auctions, and the effect of a bidder with inside information on seller revenue. See Kagel and Levin (in press) for a review of these cases.
12 Klemperer (2002) reports that in the US spectrum auctions that one firm with a private Appendix: Proof To Proposition 1
Proof. First we derive the equilibrium maximum willingness to pay, w, for the advantaged bidder and the n regular bidders. Denote by z the signal of the advantaged bidder and by y = Y 1 n the highest signal of the n regulars. As in the symmetric case, the maximum willingness to pay is derived as that price where a bidder is indifferent between winning and paying w or losing, accounting for the information in such an event. This is, in equilibrium, there is a tie w between that bidder and another bidder which makes that bidder indifferent between winning or losing at that price. For the advantaged bidder such an event implies a tie with a regular's bid (as there is only one advantaged bidder). Thus, (n−1)(1+2²) ]α(n, ε)y. As in the symmetric (pure) second-price, common-value case it is easy to verify (resulting from the way we construct the maximum willingness to pay functions) that: i) in equilibrium, the winner's expected earning is positive; ii) neither the advantaged bidder, nor any of the n regular bidders wish to deviate from the proposed bidding functions.
.
